Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1999

Application-Centered Internet Analysis
Tim Wu
Columbia Law School, twu@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tim Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, VOL. 85, P. 1163, 1999 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1177

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Application-Centered Internet Analysis
Author(s): Timothy Wu
Source: Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 6 (Sep., 1999), pp. 1163-1204
Published by: Virginia Law Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1073968 .
Accessed: 14/01/2011 10:48
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=vlr. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Virginia Law Review is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Virginia Law
Review.

http://www.jstor.org

ESSA Y
APPLICATION-CENTERED INTERNET ANALYSIS
Timothy Wu*
T

HERE is a now-standarddebate about law and the Internet.

One side asserts that the Internet is so new and different that it
calls for new legal approaches, even its own sovereign law. The
other side argues that, although it is a new technology, the Internet
nonetheless presents familiarlegal problems. It is a battle of analogies: One side refers to Cyberspace as a place, while the other essentially equates the Internet and the telephone.
In my view, these two positions are both wrong and right:wrong
in their characterizationof the Internet as a whole, yet potentially
right about particularways of using the Internet. The real problem
is that both sides (and indeed, most legal writing) rely on a singular
model of the Internet. They take one way of using the Internet as
a proxy for the whole thing and conclude "the Internet this" or
"the Internet that."
In earlier times, this simplification worked. Then, the Internet
was new and less diverse. But today, most noticeably for purposes
of legal analysis, the singular model is failing. In actual usage, on
which legal questions usually turn, the Internet does not generalize
well. The Internet is only the genus, the application, the species;
applications can and do vary dramatically. To the user, the Internet comes in many incarnations-email, the World Wide Web,
ICQ,1 and more. A singular model of Internet usage has become
too small to capture the dramaticdiversity of today's Internet.
* Clerkto JusticeStephenBreyer,SupremeCourtof the United
States, 1999-2000.
J.D., HarvardLaw School, 1998;B.Sc., McGill University,1995. The authorwould
like to thankLarryLessig for providingvery helpfulfeedbackand the opportunityto
develop these ideas; Israel Friedman,Jack Goldsmith,RichardA. Posner, Eric Posner, Robert Sitkoff, and Polk Wagnerfor extremelyhelpful commentsand suggestions; and the membersof the DirksenPaperTalk Group,where this Essay was first
presented.
I For a descriptionof ICQ,see infranote 103.
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Accordingly,I wouldlike to suggestan upgrade. For most purposes, I thinkwe oughtto discardthe old talk of the Internetas a
whole, for the whole Internet is rarely an appropriatelevel on
which to generalize. Instead,legal thinkingcan better focus on
where the variationthat is apparentto the user is actuallyfound:
the applicationlayerabovethe Internet'sbasicprotocols.We need,
I think, to focus on the user, not on the network,and that means
legal analysisthatbeginswiththe application.
What'sthe difference? This seeminglytechnicalpoint matters
becausethe Internetby its designallows-even encourages-great
diversityabove a few basicstandards.The "end-to-end"designof
the Internet delegates the power to code function to the point
nearestto the user:the application.As a result,nearlyeverything
that "counts"aboutthe Internetfrom a legal standpointis a function of the particularapplicationat issue andnot of the basicInternet protocols. Since applicationsactually drive Internet usage,
they ought also drive legal analysisof the Internet,yielding nuancedratherthanstereotypedresults.
The crucialpointto understandis thatthe Internetwas expressly
designedto put the applicationin charge. (Importantly,by this I
mean the application,broadly conceived-the programsthemselves (e.g., email, telnet, browsers,etc.) and their associatedprotocols; in other words, everything above the basic Internet
standards.)The Internet,like manynetworks,has a layeredarchitecture. Thatis to say, all the tasksnecessaryto communicatingvia
networkare dividedamongseveralfunctionallayers,and the programs residing on these layers cooperate in standardizedways.
Applicationsand their associatedprotocolsoccupy a layer above
the basic Internetprotocolsthat supervisebasicdata transmission.
And so we can see that the designersof the Internethad a real
choice aboutwhereto place the functionalityof the network-how
muchfreedomto give to the applicationand how muchcontrolto
maintain through the low level protocols. The monumental
choice-expressed famouslyas a design principlein Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark's "end-to-end"design argument2 was to make the basic Internetprotocolssimple,general,
Jerome H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM
Transactionsin ComputerSystems277 (1984), reprintedin Innovationsin Internet2
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and open, leavingthe power and functionalityin the handsof the
application. As a recent commentby the same authorsexplains,
"Movingfunctionsand servicesupwardin a layereddesign,closer
to the application(s)that use them, increasesthe flexibilityand
autonomyof the applicationdesignerto applythose functionsand
servicesto the specificneeds of the application."3The impactof
the end-to-enddesign principle,embeddedin the architectureof
the Internet,is crucialto any analysisof the Internet,and legal
analysisis no exception.
To understandthis point, just think of the "network"of appliances in your home:They all use the same standardof electricity
(the basic protocol),but then widely differin what they offer the
user. A televisionofferssomethingquite differentthanthe power
saw, even thoughboth use 110volts of electricity.Thisis the result
of a deliberatechoice. The designof the electricity"network"puts
most of the powerto decidefunctionalityin the handsof the appliance designer. The Internet,conceptually,is not all that different.
Contrastthis with the telephonenetwork,wherenearlyeverything
thatmattersaboutthe telephonecomesfromthe basicstandardsto
which all telephones adhere. The differencebetween these networksis the resultof a deliberateand importantdecision,and one
that cannotbut have a decisiveimpacton the legal analysisof any
network. The InterludebetweenPart I and PartII explainsthese
pointsin greaterdetail.

working195 (CraigPartridgeed., 1988). "End-to-end"argumentsare referredto as
such because they recognizethat a class of functionscan only be completelyand correctly implementedby the applicationsat each end of a network communication;
hence, delegationof this functionto lowerprotocolswill generallybe redundant.Put
anotherway, end-to-enddesignargumentsrecognizethat buildingcomplexfunctions
into lower levels of a networkimplicitlyoptimizesthe networkfor one set of uses but
may then increase the costs of the networkfor uses that were unpredictableor unknown at the time the networkis designed. The end-to-enddesign principleis featured prominently in the helpful summary of "ArchitecturalPrinciples of the
Internet"in RFC ("Request for Comments")1958 (visited July 13, 1999) <http://
www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfcl958.html>;
see also infra notes 74-77 and accompanyingtext
(discussingthe end-to-enddesignprinciple).
I David P. Reed et al., Active Networkingand End-To-EndArguments,12 IEEE
Network69, 70 (1998).
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The purposeof this Essayis to encouragea legal analysisthat is
more cognizantof the effects of the Internet'snetworkarchitecture. That architectureprovides,and even encourages,a rich and
diverseuniverseof possibleapplications,foreclosingsimplegeneralizationof the Internetas a whole. For this reason,much legal
analysisoughtusuallybeginat the level of the Internet'sindividual
applications,and not at the level of "Cyberspace."Whatthis ultimatelymeans is an analysisthat focuses on the user, and how the
Internetactuallyappearsto the user,ratherthan an abstractfocus
on the networkas a whole.
This richerfocus on Internetusage makes things a little more
complicated. Therefore,the second purpose of this Essay is to
suggestcoherentwaysto thinkaboutandto classifythe partsof the
Internet-to dissectin legallyrelevantwaysthe universeof existing
and possible Internetapplications. Sometimesit makes sense to
look at applicationsindividually;other times, applicationscan be
groupedby functionalcharacteristicsor by adherenceto certain
protocols;and in certain cases every applicationthat adheres to
the Internet's standardswill be affected similarly, making an
analysisof the whole Internetreasonable. I suggesttwo tools for
groupingapplicationsin this Essay that correspondto two main
areasof Internetlaw, thoughthe field for groupingapplicationsis
open.
Twomainareaswherethe lawandthe Internethavemet-proxies
for public and private regulation questions, respectivelydemonstrate the great difference that an application-centered
analysismakes. PartI considersthe FirstAmendmentanalysisof
the Internet,a discussionthatstandsas representativefor any issue
of public regulationof the Internet. Part II brings applicationspecific methodsto the now-historicaldebate over whethersome
form of strongself-governancemakessense for the Internet. This
discussion,in turn, is representativeof questionsof private,contractualregulationof the Internet.
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Two years ago, in Reno v. ACLU,4 the Supreme Court announced that the Internetreceives full First Amendmentprotection.5 This proclamationwas a tremendousvictory;so phrasedit
tells us that everythingat the applicationlevel-email, the World
Wide Web, Usenet,6and "finger"7-willreceive the most exacting
judicialattention. But our enthusiasmought be realistic. Sooner
or later, because these applications(your browser,email, and so
on) vary quite dramaticallyfrom a functionalperspective,Reno's
one rule for the entire Internetmay begin to lose its luster and
perhaps feel ridiculous. The great variation among Internet
applications is hard to fit into one First Amendment box. Just
as there is no argumentthat electricitycompelssimilartreatment
of the television and the fax machine under the First Amendment, treating every Internet-adherentapplicationas part of a
single domain of First Amendmentanalysiscan look a little farfetched.
For an illustrationof the problemwith the Reno simplification,
look no furtherthanyouremailinbox. Reno v. ACLU tells us that
over the Internetdo not 'invade'an individ"'[c]ommunications
ual's home or appearon one's computerscreen unbidden."'8But
this is only true of some applications. Junk email is invasive in
waysthat the WorldWideWeb is not, andhence Reno'ssimplified
treatmentof the Internethas little resonancefor anyonewho suf4521

U.S. 844 (1997).

5 See

infra Section I.A.

"Usenet"is the name of the largest"discussiongroup"accessibleby the Internet.
It consistsof electronicbulletinboardsdevoted to specifictopics,where users,usinga
specificprogram(a "newsreader"client), may read postingsor make their own contributions. Usenet and electronic bulletin boards were a dominantfeature of the
Internetand other networksin the 1980sand early 1990s,but the adventof the commercializationof the Internetand the rise of the World Wide Web have left much
(though not all) of Usenet a burnt-outshell full of crass solicitation. There is no
shortage of historical studies on this 20-year-old application. See, e.g., Michael
Hauben & Ronda Hauben,On the EarlyDays of Usenet:The Roots of the Cooperative Online Culture (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/
Tim North, The Internetand Usenet Global Comissue3-8/chapterlO/index.html>;
puter Networks(1994) <http://www.vianet.net.au/-timn/thesis/index.html>.
7 "Finger"is an Internet-compliant
applicationthat allows the user to look up the
vital stats of another Internetuser. Its name is metaphorical:One "fingers"an addressin the Internet"whitepages."
8 Reno, 521 U.S. at 869 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
6
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fers under an invasionof thousandsof "get rich quick"schemes
(and worse) in their inboxes. When a seriousconstitutionalchallenge is made to junk email legislation,it seems inevitablethat a
reducedlevel of constitutionalscrutinyfor email will follow,justified, ultimately,by its invasivenature. And this suggestsan easy,if
rough, principle for classifying Internet applicationsfor First
Amendmentpurposes. Privacy-invasiveapplicationsthat deliver
content unbidden-most often, "push"applications-shouldmerit
reducedFirstAmendmentscrutiny.Yet noninvasiveapplicationsusually"pull"applicationsthatrely on the userto go out andselect
content-fit Reno's conceptionof a noninvasiveInternetand the
analysisthatfollows.
The distinctionbetweenpushand pull applicationsis just an example. The point is that Internetapplicationsvary too greatlyto
be grouped within one single First Amendmentcategory. And
similaroverly simplifiedanalysisof the Internetis a problemnot
only in First Amendmentcase law, but in much Internetscholarship. Finally,when it comes to debatesover filtering,PICS,9and
similarissues,the effectsof the Internet'scurrentnetworkarchitectureoughtnot be overlooked.

The discussionin Part II addressesthe unusuallycholeric academicdebatesurroundingtwo questions-whetherCyberspaceis a
"place"and whetherit shouldhave its own laws. This debate has
revertedto its origins-it has becomepurelyacademic,a curiosity
of early Internetlegal history. Courtsand governmentshave not
been shy to exercisejurisdictionover Internettransactions.That,
and a lack of any real demandfor a general online adjudicatory
authority,have scuttleddreamsof a Cyberspacenation. But the
topic remainsof interest. For while Cyberspace,as some sort of
imaginarykingdom,is not much more than farcicalas a jurisdiction, there are nonethelessplaceson the Internetwhereprivateregimesdo exist,and deferenceto theirwaiverof real-spaceruleshas
some cogency.

9 "PICS"standsfor "Platformfor InternetContentSelection." For a discussionof
PICS,see infranote 62.
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Again a focus on the application-and the differencesbetween
applications-makesall the difference.A few applications(though
not many) are utterly unconcernedwith real-space goals, and
rarely,if ever, have real-spaceeffects-call them the "Internetas
an end." The pure examplesare multi-playervideo games and
those online worldscalledMUDs ("Multi-UserDungeons").10For
these kindsof privategroups,the normativeargumentfor a private
set of rulesis strong,just as for anyprivategroupin the real world.
This is not to say that mandatoryrules would not be imposed
should, somehow, real-spaceconsequencesaccrue-a conspiracy
made online shouldenjoyno immunityfromprosecution.But just
as the National Hockey League sets the penalty for "tripping,"
there is no reason to preemptsome similarkind of privateorder
amongthese groups.
Most Internet applications,however, are used simply as a
"means"to do exactlywhatone wantedto do anyhow. WhenI buy
my train ticket by packet ratherthan by dial tone it seems ludicrous to imagine that I suddenlybecome exclusivelysubject to
some strangeCyberlaw. This "ends/means"distinction-although
generaland very far frominfallible-providesguidanceas to when
any talk of a privateorderwill make any sense at all. And the answer is that outside of a few, game-likeexamples,it almostnever
makes sense to speak of a Cyberspacesovereigntythat oughtnormativelyto be immuneto realworldjurisdiction.
The largerpointis thatthinkingaboutthe Internetas a homogenouswholeleadsquicklyto extremeresults,usuallystemmingfrom
the choice of an analogythat only makessense for one application.
And the same absurditywill often be true of regulationconceived
with one applicationin mind,yet then appliedto the entire Internet. For a futurelikely to be full of new and even more divergent
applications,it would be best to effect a hastydisposalof this old,
one-size-fits-allway of thinking.

10 For an explanationof MUDs, see infra

note 86.
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I. WHEN' THE INTERNET MET THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
PUBLIC INTERNET REGULATION

A

In 1997,the Internetmet the FirstAmendment,'1and the result
of this encounterwas the launchof a new rule. In case you are not
alreadywell-acquainted,
here it is:
"TheInternetGets FullFirstAmendmentProtection."
A gr~at victory,this was, and quite a good rule (especiallyif the
only choice were betweenit and its logicalopposite,"TheInternet
Gets No First AmendmentProtection").But euphoriaought not
blindus to Reno v. A CLU'slimits. The spiritandthe politicalmessage of Reno-a reprimandof broadandhastilyconceivedInternet
laws-may provemore significantand lastingthanits content. We
may come to rememberthe mid-1990sas a crucialand dangerous
time for the Internet'sdevelopment,a time wherestrongmedicine
was needed to controlgovernmenthysteria."But as a lastingFirst
Amendment principle,the Reno rule makes a poor bet, for it
groupsinto one constitutionalbox a huge rangeof highlyvariable
Internetusage,andthis cannotlastforever.
A sourceof this overinclusiveapproachis the commongeneralization, echoed by the SupremeCourt,that the Internetis a "medium." Not an unreasonablegeneralizationfor a new mannerof
transmittinginformation,perhaps,but in the world of the First
Amendmentthe word "medium"carriesseriousconsequences. It
is used to drawa line arounda groupof waysto communicateand
to proclaimthat a given level of constitutionalscrutinywill apply
there.13And so we find,for example,thatbroadcastradiois a First
" See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). A new round of litigation has just
begun followingthe passageof the ChildOnline ProtectionAct ("COPA"),a scaledback versionof the CommunicationsDecency Act ("CDA")whose applicationis limited to commercialpurposes,the WorldWide Web, and materialthat is harmfulfor
minors. See 47 U.S.C.A. ? 231(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999);infra note 18 (discussing
COPA and the currentlitigationconcerningit).
12 Cf. Dan M. Kahan& TraceyL. Meares,Foreword:The ComingCrisisof Criminal Procedure,86 Geo. L.J. 1153 (1998) (arguingthat the criminalprocedureregime
erected in the 1960s was a necessaryresponse to the institutionalizedracismof that
period but one that has largelyoutlivedits utilityundercurrentconditions).
13 This functionis similar,in some respects,to judicialdelineationof the boundaries
of a given public forum. See, e.g., ChicagoAcorn v. MetropolitanPier and Exposi-
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Amendmentmedium,that cable televisionis a First Amendment
medium(differentfrom broadcasttelevision),and that even snail
mail14can be thoughtof as a FirstAmendmentmedium. All that
this means is that every way of communicatingencompassed,for
example,by the phrase"cabletelevision"gets the same treatment
underthe FirstAmendment.
Yet this First Amendment meaning of the word "medium"
makes an exceptionallypoor fit for the full range of existingand
possible Internetapplications.A radiois prettymuch a one trick
pony-a good trick,yes, but in essencethere'sonly one way a person can use a radio. But the Internet,to understatethe obvious,
can be used in more thanone way. Indeedit can even be usedjust
like a radio, telephone, or television-used to replicatethe functional characteristicsof the existing"media"and then some.15 If
these "media"each merit their own specialconstitutionalconsideration, how can the Internet,capable of replicatingall of these
media and adding some for good measure-be handled by one
simpleparadigm?The constitutionalmeaningof "medium"is too
smallfor the Internet.It has outgrownits box.
At the level of case analysis,this problemmanifestsin a mischaracterizationthat clouds Reno's analysis. Reno relied on the
districtcourt'sfindingthat "theInternetis not as 'invasive'as radio
or television.... 'Communicationsover the Internet do not 'invade' an individual'shome or appear on one's computerscreen

tion Auth., 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998) (dividingChicago'sNavy Pier into various
levels of constitutionalscrutinybased on publicforumanalysis). Indeed, it would be
quite plausibleto have had the entireinitialargumentover the FirstAmendmentand
the Internet assume the cast of a public forum argument. This has not happened,
and, as it stands,neither the SupremeCourtnor any federalappealscourtshave put
the Internetand publicforumin the same paragraph.So while it seems a little uncertain whether public forum will ever catch on for Internet analysis,as David Goldstone remindsus, "Rome'sforumswere not built in a day; cyberspace'swill not be
either." David J. Goldstone, A FunnyThing Happenedon The Way to The Cyber
Forum: Public vs. Private in CyberspaceSpeech, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1998)
[hereinafterGoldstone,A FunnyThingHappened];see also David J. Goldstone,The
PublicForumDoctrinein the Age of the InformationSuperhighway(WhereAre The
PublicForumson The InformationSuperhighway?),
46 HastingsL.J.335 (1995) (earlier workon the same topic).
14
That is, regularmail-"snail-like" as comparedto electronicmail.
11Granted, some of this replicationis not so great-especially what I am calling
"television"-but the functionalfeaturesare the same.
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unbidden. Users seldom encountercontent 'by accident.""'''6
Yet
the example of junk email-a terribleand unbiddennuisanceshows that this characterizationof the Internet is incorrect,for
junk email does arriveunbiddenand does invade a user'sinbox.17
And yet this characterizationwas apparentlycritical to Justice
John Paul Stevens'sconclusionthat the Internet(as a whole) was
not to be subjectto any reducedFirstAmendmentscrutiny.In reality, the invasivenessof the Internetcannotbe ascertainedat the
level of the entireInternet. Rather,the questionmustbe answered
at the applicationlevel, for some applicationsare privacy-invasive,
and some are not. Praiseis due for the first Internetdecision of
our time, a step in the rightdirection,but praiseoughtnot blindus
to its limits.
So the Reno v. ACLU rule looks to be an overgeneralization.18
But then it is not particularlyunusualor unreasonablefor case law
to begin with an overinclusiveor underinclusiverule and then to
clarifymatterslater.19It seems only a matterof time before the
Internetceases to be consideredas a single, uniformdomain of
First Amendmentscrutiny.20Such thingsare hardto predict,but
perhapsthe setting for this changewill be the first constitutional
16
Reno, 521 U.S. at 869 (quotingACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
17 The statement of facts describingthe Internet does talk about email, see id. at
851, but the opinion rests its scrutiny-levelanalysison facts that are only true of the
WorldWide Web, i.e., that nothing appearswithoutthe user seeking it and that the
user is seldomsurprisedby unexpectedcontent. See id. at 868-70.
18 It is doubtfulthat the latest round of Internet-indecency
litigationwill challenge
this oversight,as COPA was writtento apply only to the WorldWide Web. See 47
U.S.C.A. ? 231(a)(1) (Supp. 1999). So far COPA has been held unconstitutional.
See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp.2d 473,476-77 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
19Other, non-FirstAmendment,decisionshave been far more application-specific.
See, e.g., Compuserve,Inc. v. CyberPromotions,Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (holding that the use of Compuserve'sserversto send junk email withoutconsent is trespassto chattels).
20Muchof the debate between the rule in Reno v. ACLU and what I propose is reflected in the exchange between Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Anthony Kennedy in Denver Area EducationalTelecommunicationsConsortium,Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727 (1996). Justice Kennedy supportsthe adoption of a categorical,allencompassingapproachto the FirstAmendment,see id. at 780, 784-87 (Kennedy,J.,
concurring),while JusticeBreyerprefersa narrow,hesitant,and technologicallyspecific approach,see id. at 739-44 (Breyer,J., pluralityopinion);see also id. at 774-78
(Souter, J., concurring)(rejectingJustice Kennedy'sposition, chiding, "First,do no
harm.")(internalquotationmarksomitted).

1999]

InternetAnalysis
Application-Centered

1173

challengeto the regulationof email (provideda technicalor economicsolutiondoes not preempta legal rescue). Reno'sassurance
that "The Internet Gets Full First AmendmentProtection"can
look prettythinwhenthereare 49,000new messagesin yourinbox,
or when your so-calledcyberlifeconsistsof deletingads for pyramid schemes and porn sites. Nearly everyone hates junk email,
even cyberlibertarians
(althoughmanytake comfortin their superior filteringskills), and there is a prettysimplereasonwhy:Junk
email is invasiveand offensive. Sound familiar? Indeed, spam21
may turn out to be "the seven dirtywords"of the Internet;22in its
wake,the monoliththatnow constitutesInternetFirstAmendment
analysiswill witnessits firstpartition.23

21 Spam has become a generic term for unwantedcontent, althoughit is most frequently used (as here) as a synonymfor junk email, typicallyunwantedsolicitations
of a salaciousor illegal nature. For more on spam, and the many campaignsorganized to fight it, see Scott Hazen Mueller, Fight Spam on the Internet <http://
spam.abuse.net/>(visited July 13, 1999), and the Coalition Against Unsolicited
CommercialEmail ("CAUCE")<http://www.cauce.org>
(visitedJuly 13, 1999) [hereinafter CAUCE website] ("TakeBack Your Mailbox"). The topic of how exactly to
fight spamis interestingbecauseit is an open questionand somethingof a race of the
modalitiesof regulation. Will law, the market,social norms,or a technologicalapproach ("the code") be the best weapon for killingspam? Externalsocial sanctions
were tried first, but they seem to have little effect on the people behind spam, the
"cyberpromoters"of the world. Technologicalsolutions have been proposed and
implemented:Some people filter, and on Usenet, exotic solutions such as "cancelbots" (robotsthat find spampostingsand delete them) have been popular. The market, combinedwith social sanctions,may have the final say. See ChristopherJones,
Marketers Losing Taste for Spam, Wired News (Nov. 12, 1998) <http:llwww.
wired.com/news/news/business/story/16216.html>.
Finally,there is always talk of federal legislation,such as an amendmentto the federal "junkfax" law. See, e.g., H.R.
1748, 105th Cong. (1997). Some states, includingNevada, Washington,and California, have actually passed such legislation,although the approachestaken by these
states vary. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code ?? 17511.1, 17538.4, 17538.45(West
1997 & Supp. 1999); Wash. Rev. Code ?? 19.190.020, 19.190.030 (West 1999).
Groupssuch as CAUCE oppose the type of legislationthat merely imposes labeling
requirements(suchas the Californialaw) to sucha degree that they plan to challenge
it as compelledspeech. See CAUCE website, supra. Obviously,junk email is not a
problem ideally handled at the state level; any federal legislation, if or when it is
passed,will preemptthe state legislation.
22 Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the possibility of
sanctioningGeorge Carlinfor his monologueon "theseven dirtywords").
23 For an exampleof this kind of partitionmaking,see ChicagoAcorn v. Metropolitan Pier and ExpositionAuthority,150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998), where the Seventh
Circuitcarefullydivided Chicago'smonolithicNavy Pier into several zones of differing FirstAmendmentscrutiny.
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If junk email legislation is seriously tested, email will likely be
found a fitting place to apply intermediate scrutiny, a balancing
test, or an equivalent formula, stemming from a conclusion that
regulation of email is justified as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction;24 or that there exists a captive audience,25 or
perhaps even that junk email is commercial speech.26 Perhaps in
their consideration of such a case, courts will rely directly on
Rowan v. UnitedStatesPost Office Department,27
which allowed the
state to facilitate the filtering of real mail.28 Courts might even say
that email is a "medium" or "modality" different from the World
Wide Web that merits different First Amendment treatment.29 In
the absence of a real case it is hard to say which litigation strategy
will work best, but it is the result, and the reason behind the result,
that matters here. Email spam is invasive, just like real mail is invasive,3 incoming calls are invasive31 abortion picketing outside
your front door is invasive,32 and so on. The underlying reasoning
is important because it lets us forecast the future of the Internet
and the First Amendment.
B
The example of junk email suggests a way to group Internet usage (and applications) for First Amendment purposes. By this
grouping, I want to specify what we can say, ex ante, based on the
technology alone; for of course, in individual cases, the content of
the speech (indecent speech, for example) will make a difference. I
think scrutiny will and should split in accordance with the invasion
of privacy attendant to usage, and this, of course, depends on the
24 Cf. Wardv. Rock Against
Racism,491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explainingthe time,
place, and manneranalysis).
25Cf. Frisbyv. Schultz,487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (explainingthe captive audience
doctrine).
26 Cf. CentralHudson Gas & Elec. Corp.v. PublicServ. Comm'n,447 U.S.
557, 563
(1980) (explainingthe commercialspeechdoctrine).
27 397 U.S. 728
(1970).

Is See id. at 737-38.
29Cf. TurnerBroad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-40 (1994) (treatingcable

and broadcasttelevisionas differentFirstAmendmentmedia).
30

See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737-38.

See Gormleyv. Director,Conn. State Dep't of Probation,632 F.2d 938, 942 (2d
Cir. 1980).
32
See Frisbyv. Schultz,487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988).
31
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splitbeapplicationbeingused. Thisyieldsa basicandunsurprising
and nonprivacy-invasive
tween privacy-invasive
speechon the Internet,whichcanbe mappedto invasiveandnoninvasiveapplications.
The SupremeCourthas a collectionof "specialreasons"to justify reducedscrutinyfor a given "medium."Some,like a historyof
and a scarcityof availablefreextensive governmentregulation33
have little relevanceto the Internet. Yet anotherjustiquencies,34
fication, stated usuallyas a communication's"invasivenature,"35
has teeth, for thisjustificationstandsdirectlyat a collisionbetween
a recognizedindividualright and the First Amendment. People
like theirprivacy,and the SupremeCourt,perhapseagerto please,
recognized a right to privacy.3' And the data compiled in the
United StatesReportsshowsus thatwhenthese two rightsface off,
the FirstAmendmentusuallycomesout the loser.37Thisis particu33 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1969) (relyingon
the spectrumscarcityof broadcasttelevisionto justifyreducedscrutiny).
3 See id.; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1994)
(noting the inapplicabilityof the scarcityrationalein the contextof cable).
3S See, e.g., FCC v. PacificaFound.,438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (statingthat broadcast radiois invasiveand accessibleto children).
36See Griswoldv. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
37 For SupremeCourtcases in whichthe FirstAmendmentlost out to assertedprivacy interests, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks);Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department,397 U.S. 728 (1970) (unsolicitedmail);FCC v.
PacificaFoundation,438 U.S. 726 (1978) (radiobroadcastto the home);and Frisbyv.
Schultz,487 U.S. 474 (1988) (focusedpicketingof a certainhouse). For cases in the
lower courts,see Gormleyv. Director,ConnecticutState Departmentof Probation,
632 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir. 1980) (harassingphone calls); Destination Ventures v.
FCC,46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (junkfaxes);and Moserv. FCC,46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.
1995) (telemarketing). For the only instancesin which the First Amendment has
really won invasion-of-the-homecases, see Martinv. Struthers,319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(distinguishedendlessly-see, for example, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485
(1988)), and, more significantly,the publicitycases. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975);Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967). These cases show that privacyinterests,while formidable,can
still be taken to taskby the real heavyweightchampionof FirstAmendmentcase law,
the media defendant(especiallywhen he assertsthe "public'sright to know"). See,
e.g., RichmondNewspapersv. Virginia,448 U.S. 555 (1980) (media's right to open
trials). But two other cases, Erznoznikv. City of Jacksonville,422 U.S. 205, 210-11
(1975), and Cohen a. California,403 U.S. 15 (1971), reinforcethe focus on privacy,
holding that when someone is out for a drive or wanderingaroundthe courthouse,
privacyclaims do not hold water and one needs to avert her gaze. For a nice overview of much of this unsavorybusiness,see MichaelW. Carroll,GarbageIn: Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited CommercialSolicitations, 11 Berkeley
Tech. L.J.233 (1996).
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larly true when the right to privacy enjoys the home team advantage: Annoying people in their homes is a cardinal sin in the world
of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court becomes likely to
say things like "protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy
of the home is certainly [an interest] of the highest order in a free
and civilized society."38As the sound trucks, ride-along journalists,
and bulk mailers of the world operate under a serious First Amendment handicap,so will theirequivalentsin Cyberspace.
This perennial tension between privacy interests and the First
Amendment seems destined to play a starring role in the story of
Internet regulation. And since the Internet, as a whole, cannot be
branded privacy-invasive or noninvasive, the distinction has to be
made where the variability lies: the application. The tension between these two big rights seems likely to play out in a distinction
between applications that in usage are privacy-invasive and those
that are not.
This conclusion really only poses the question: Which applications are privacy-invasiveand which are not? Luckily, we are not
without guides. Internet users like to use the words "pull" and
"push" to distinguish between content that you "go and get" and
that which "arrivesunbidden."39And while hardly a perfect division, it serves as a rough proxy for which types of Internet applications are privacy-invasiveand which are not. Even thougheverything
"enters the home" (if your computer is at home), pull materials by
definition come bearing your specific invitation. That is, because a
user actively "goes out and visits" websites, when he clicks on "The
Starr Report," the consequences ought be no surprise. So pulled
material cannotbe invasive, the argument goes, because the invasion is consensual, and an invasion of privacy requires a lack of
consent. The idea is similar to the tort law principle that consent
negates liability for invasion of privacy.40Push applications, on the
38Careyv. Brown,447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (dicta).
Among majorapplicationsthis breaksdown roughlyas follows:The WorldWide
Web (the HTML portions at least), Usenet, telnet, talk, and similarprogramsare
pull, while email, push channels,and most media streamersare push. But this is far
from a perfect dichotomy-consider, for example, when you click on a media
streamerfrom within the WorldWide Web. The distinctionis a startingpoint more
than the final word.
40See Restatement(Second) of Torts ? 892B (1977);id. cmt. c, illus. 1 (demonstrating that consentcurestrespassliability).
39
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other hand, by definition,deliver materialswithoutyour specific
consent,as most emailusers(and all AmericaOnline("AOL")users) well know. You do "set up" an email address or a push
channel, but only in the most meaninglessway imaginabledoes
thatmean you intendedto consentto "Mr.Barlowhas 15,308new
messages."
This guidedoes not give all the answers. Reasonablepeople can
spend a long time disagreeingover what "consent"and "privacy"
reallymean on the Internet;whethercustomand commonunderstandingscan play a role; whether,for example,subscribingto a
certain listserv41means you get everything you deserve, and
whetherthe WorldWide Web reallyis privacy-invasive
becauseof
the occasional surprises that it delivers (have you visited
www.whitehouse.com42
lately?) And it also misses out on some
importantinvasionsof privacythat are to be foundoutsideof push
applications.But it suggestsa guide for regulationof existingand
futureInternetapplications.
So what would a privacy-centeredand application-specific
First
Amendmentlaw for the Internetlook like? The rule would be
simple:Privacy-invasivetechnologiesshall be subjectto reduced
First Amendmentscrutiny. And the resultswould be as follows.
Regulationof incomingjunk email would be subjectto reduced
scrutiny,especiallyif directedat commercialjunk email. Regulation of the variousdata"forms"on the WorldWideWeb (actually,

41
A "listserv"(also called an "emailexploder")refers to a discussiongroup that
works over emails distributedto every member of a group. Listservshave a wellknown but unfortunatetendency to degenerate into spiteful and lengthy personal
spats between members,known as "flamewars." Since listservsoperate by email, a
subscribermay returnfrom a weekend away and find her mailboxclogged with hundreds of messages full of all manners of personal invectives including,invariably,
cheap comparisonsof adversariesto variousleadersof the ThirdReich.
42 <http://www.whitehouse.com>
is a pornographysite. Searchengines and directories play an interestingrole in all of this, as they frequentlyexpose users to unexpected content. Note, for example,how a searchfor "AOL"in Yahoo turnsup not
only AOL's websites but also protest sites like "WhyAOL Sucks"and "The AOL
HatersMecca." Indeed,searchengine resultpages are amongthe very few means on
the World Wide Web by which small scale protest and dissentingvoices actually
reach the public. If publicforumdoctrinewere functionallybased ratherthan hopelessly linked to historical analysis then directoryresult pages might be called the
WorldWide Web'spublicfora.
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CGI scripts43)
that solicit personalinformation,and the treatment
of that personal information, would also be balanced for
reasonableness(especially when the solicitation is directed at
minors). Similarly,all of the applicationsancillaryto the World
Wide Web that process personal financial information for
transactionalpurposeswould be subjectto intermediatescrutiny.
Next, and perhaps obviously, any "speech" that involves an
unauthorizedinvasionof another'ssystemwouldbe regulated,and
indeedis alreadycriminalized,undercomputercrimelaws.44
At bottom,the issue that botherspeople on the Internetis privacy invasion. People seem to wantthe help of theirgovernments,
and experiencetells us that the First Amendmentbuckles when
privacyinterestsare threatened.45
C

The SupremeCourt'sopinionin Reno v. ACLU is the most obvious exampleof overly generalInternetFirstAmendmentanalysis. But the same problem tarnishes much of the voluminous
academicattentiongiven to this topic, limitingthe value of this
analysis.6

43 "CGI"standsfor "common
gatewayinterface,"and "CGIscripts"are miniature
applicationsthat can be associatedwith an HTMLweb page. The forms commonly
used on the Internetto collect userinformationusuallyrely on CGI scriptsto process
the formand deliverthe user'sdata to a host computer.
4"See 18 U.S.C. ? 1030(1994).
45 Unless fortifiedby the presenceof a media defendantin the ring,that is. See supra note 37.
46Fora representativesample of articlesin which this oversightis obvious and explicit, see, for example,Robert M. O'Neil, Free Speech on the Internet:Beyond "Indecency,"38 JurimetricsJ. 617 (1998) (catalogingInternetFirst Amendment cases
with little regardto application-levelvariation);Glen 0. Robinson,The Electronic
First Amendment:An Essay for the New Age, 47 Duke Li. 899 (1998) (comparing,
en masse,the electronicand printversionsof the FirstAmendment);MarkS. Kende,
The SupremeCourt'sApproachto the FirstAmendmentin Cyberspace:Free Speech
as Technology'sHand-Maiden,14 Const. Comment.465 (1998) (criticizinga posited
abandonmentof First Amendment principlein the face of technologicaldevelopment); Robert Reilly, MappingLegal Metaphorsin Cyberspace:Evolving The UnderlyingParadigm,16 J. MarshallJ. Computer& Info. L. 579 (1998) (calling for an
"organic"model of Cyberspacethat would "viewcyberspaceas a place where a society of people exist");Thomas G. Krattenmaker& L.A. Powe, Jr., ConvergingFirst
Amendment Principlesfor ConvergingCommunicationsMedia, 104 Yale L.J. 1719
(1995) (envisioninga FirstAmendmentdoctrineessentiallyobliviousto context).
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The problemcan also be more subtle:It is when the Internetwide assumptionsare implicitthat even the most carefulanalysis
has gone astray. Consider,for example, that scholarsstudying
speechon the Internetoften take for grantedthatthe Internet(as a
whole) is a great equalizerfor mattersof speech. Writers,most
famouslyEugeneVolokh,rest substantialportionsof theiranalysis
on the notion that the Internet is a ready medium of "cheap
speech."47They are certainlycorrectthat the minimalconception
of the Internetas a connectionbetweeneverynetworkedcomputer
does make manythingscheaperfor everyone. But, in reality,the
idea that speech is cheap and that all speakersare equally heard
There are some notable exceptions to this generalization. LawrenceLessig has
been careful to distinguishamong applications,famouslycautioningagainstthe allencompassinganalogy. See LawrenceLessig, The Path of Cyberlaw,104 Yale L.J.
1743 (1995) [hereinafter,Lessig, The Path]. Most recently,he has emphasizedthe
distinctionbetweenpush/pulland discriminatory/nondiscriminatory
applications.See
LawrenceLessig, What Things Regulate Speech:CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering,38 JurimetricsJ. 629 (1998) [hereinafterLessig,WhatThings].David Goldstone'scarefulsearch
for public "cyberforums"on an application-specificbasis is another exception. See
David J. Goldstone,A FunnyThing Happened,supranote 12, at 1, 4. Finally,careful, code-specificthinkingis also found in AndrewL. Shapiro,The Disappearanceof
Cyberspaceand the Rise of Code, 8 Seton Hall Const.L.J.703 (1998).
47 See, e.g. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will
Do, 104 Yale L.J. 1805
(1995) (arguingthat cheap speech enabled by the Internetwill bring a much more
democraticand diverse environmentthan we see now); Jerry Berman & Daniel J.
Weitzner,AbundanceandUser Control:Renewingthe DemocraticHeart of the First
Amendmentin the Age of InteractiveMedia, 104 Yale L.J. 1619(1995) (arguingthat
the Internetremoves barriersto entry into the marketplaceof ideas that previously
interferedwith full realizationof the FirstAmendment'saims);EdwardA. Cavazos,
The Idea Incubator:Why the InternetPoses Unique Problemsfor the First Amendment, 8 Seton Hall Const.L.J.667 (1998) (Internetlowers "speakerburden");Robert
Kline, Freedom of Speech on the Electronic Village Green: Applying the First
AmendmentLessons of Cable Televisionto the Internet,6 CornellJ.L. & Pub. Pol'y
23, 24-25 (1996) (maintainingthat the Internet,by servingas "a wide-open,interactive frontierthat has no centralcontrolfigure"and by allowinglow-cost speech "provides for the exchangeof ideas on a massivescale on a varietyof topics limited only
by the humanimagination");KathleenM. Sullivan,FirstAmendmentIntermediaries
in the Age of Cyberspace,45 UCLA L. Rev. 1653, 1669-71 (1998) (studyingthe disintermediationin Internet communicationwhile acknowledgingthat the relative
equality of Internetspeech is a featureof the present only); Lee Tien, Who's Afraid
of Anonymous Speech? McIntyreand the Internet,75 Or. L. Rev. 117 (1996); Fred
H. Cate, Indecency, Ignorance, and Intolerance:The First Amendment and the
Regulation of ElectronicExpression,1995 J. Online L. 5, ? 66 (Dec.) <http://www.
wm.edu/law/publications/jol/cate2.html>
(arguingthat the structureof the Internet
makes it an egalitarianmediumwhere "the real test of expressionand ideas is their
own value, not the statusor affiliationof theirsource").
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increasinglydepends on what applicationyou are talking about.
The WorldWide Web is the deviant,for the impactof a message
on the WorldWide Web has alreadybegun to depend heavilyon
the identity(thatis, mostlythe wealth)of the speaker. The impact
of a website dependsquite a bit on how good your web design (or
web designer) is, what domain name you manage to get, how
many banneradvertisementsyou can buy, and what kind of fancy
plug-insyou can affordto support. (Indeed,media streamerslike
realplayer49
may be the most "unequal"applicationsadheringto
the Internet.) And as search engines inevitablybegin to charge
for "priority"listings, and heavy Java programmingbecomes increasinglystandard,the impactof the stereotypicallittle person's
site will likely continue to decrease. Add to this the increase in
competitionstemmingfrom the great financialincentivesof owning a high-trafficsite, and the results look troubling for highimpactweb-basedcheap speech. This is not to say that there are
not exceptions(with Matt Drudge'swebsite servingas the archetype50)or that things have not changed, but that describingtoday's WorldWide Web as a free and open forumof equal speech
is a bit delusional.
These disparitiesdo not hold truefor forumslike emaillistservs.
On a successfullistserv everyone still basicallylooks the same."
Everyonegets her turn,andthe impactof a messageis stillmoreor
48Here,in additionto money,the ownershipof a registeredtrademarkmakes a difference, because the owner of the registeredtrademarkmay challenge the "illegitimate" owner of that domain name. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications,Inc. v.
West Coast EntertainmentCorp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (senior trademark
user granted preliminaryinjunctionon junior user's use of trademarkas domain
name); Giacalone v. Network Solutions,Inc., No. C-96 20434 RPA/PVT, 1996 WL
887734(N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996) (grantinginjunctionin favorof trademarkholder to
prevent anotherfrom using domainname identicalto that trademark);see also, e.g.,
Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy, Dispute Policy ? (8)(a) (visited
July 22, 1999) <http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/docs/dnpol3.html>
(providingthat owner
of exactlymatchingtrademarkmay challengeownerof domainname).
49 Media streamersuse certainclever algorithmsto send live sound or
video in realtime (i.e., withoutwaitingfor the entirefile to download)wheneverthe viewerwants.
The result, given present bandwidthconstraints,is a good "pull"version of radio,
but, at least for the present,is a very pale imitationof television'sframerate and picturesize. Formoreinformation,
see <http://www.realplayer.com>
(visitedJuly13, 1999).
5 Matt Drudgerunsa famousgossipcolumnof low budgetyet highimpactthat can
be found at <http://www.drudgereport.comlmatt.htm>
(visitedJuly 13, 1999).
51
It is truethatemailaddressescanbe moreorlessprestigious,
butthisis a minorpoint.
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less correlatedwiththe value (or lack of value) of whatthe speaker
has to say ratherthan with her net worth. On a listserv,it is still
true that no one knows you're a dog. This disparitybetween
listservsand the WorldWide Web provesa largerpoint:The lines
of the applicationcontrol the questionof speech-equality,and it
has become increasinglymeaninglessto speak generallyof the Internet as a whole as a mediumof equal speech. Scholarshipthat
blindlybrandsthe Internetor Cyberspaceas this or that kind of
place for speechis missingthe point.
Thisis not to downplaythe impactthe WorldWideWeb has had
on the way people get information.The disintermediationeffects
of the World Wide Web (speakersbeing able to reach listeners
withoutthe aid of intermediaries)are real,52althoughone oughtto
notice, parenthetically,that searchengines are serious,if benign,
controllersof the powerof listenersto actuallyfindspeakersin the
firstplace. The pointis that these questionsneed to be sensitiveto
theirapplication
contextandnotprojectedon the Internetas a whole.
LawrenceLessig,amongwriters,mustbe said to be particularly
sensitiveto the importanceof the application;he urgedthe rejection of the single controllinganalogyearly on53and has continued
to focus on differencesin speech-vendingtechnologyas between
applications.54Yet when it comes to one crucial, and favorite,
topic-change in the architectureof the Internet-he downplays
the saliencyof applicationautonomybuiltinto the Internet'sarchitecture. Lessigtends to assumethat changein the architectureof
Cyberspacewill affectall applicationssimultaneouslyandsimilarly.
But for mostpurposes,it seems thatfew things(outsideof a change
in the fundamentalprotocols and cross-applicationtechnologies,
consideredbelow) would necessarilycause differingparts of the
Internetto changeat the samespeed or in the samedirection.This
is a consequenceof the layeredarchitecture:The modulardesign
generallyallows applicationsto change independentlyof one another and the basicprotocols. And I thinkit wouldbe no surprise
to find differentparts of the Internetchangingin differentdirecOn disintermediation,see Sullivan,supranote 47.
See Lessig,The Path,supranote 46, at 1745-47.
-4 See, e.g., Lessig, WhatThings,supranote 46, at 644-45 (placingInternet
applications into one of four categories based on push/pull and discriminatory/nondiscriminatoryaxes),
52

53
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tions, in response to the different demands. Financialwebsites
will never be big on user anonymity,but why a change to more
secure online tradingcannot coexist with the anonymousMUD
cultureis unclearto me. Instead,I thinkthe more importantthe
Internetbecomes,the more one mightexpect diversityin the features of what it offers, as a reflectionof the underlyingdemands
of society.
But Lessig's argumentsare deeper than this. He focuses on
certain technologies-of which digital certificates55
are the best
example-with broad cross-applicationapplicability. And such
technologies,set up as an auxiliaryto all usage of the Internet,
could create a new baselineof regulability.56
In the digitalcertificate example,if usingrobustdigitalself-identificationbecame expected in everyaspectof Internetusage,then the formerdefaultof
a basicallyanonymousInternetwouldbe replacedwith an Internet
wherebasicinformationis known.
And so, this kind of change is a real possibility. A change as
fundamentalas addingself-identificationto every applicationoperatesat a level relevantto all Internetusage. But the possibleand
the probableare not the same thing,and it is importantto notice
some of the obstacles. To representa wholesale change, there
must be an agreed-uponstandardthat becomesa defaultrequirement for all the majorapplications,so that userswho wish to use
the Internetneed to obey the standardor face annoyingtransaction costs (the method of most regulation). Independentrequirements are not the same-if your bank forces you to keep its
implementationof digitalcertificatetechnologyon yourcomputer,
this is a change,yes, and is even a net increasein Internetregulability,but it lacksthe significanceof an Internet-widechange. But
settingup such a necessarilypublicstandardpresentscollectiveac55
Digital certificatesare a system, based on an underlyingpublic key encryption
technology, for robustly confirmingthe identity of the party with which you are
transacting-a need most obviouslypressingwhen the transactionis financialin nature. For more on digitalcertificates,see the ABA's Sectionof Scienceand Technology, Electronic Commerce Division, Information Security Committee, Digital
SignatureGuidelines (1996) (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/
A. MichaelFroomkin,The EssentialRole of TrustedThirdParec/isc/dsgfree.html>;
ties in ElectronicCommerce,75 Or. L. Rev. 49, 49 (1996).
56See LawrenceLessig,Code, and OtherLawsof Cyberspace42-48 (1999) (unpublished manuscript,on file with the VirginiaLaw ReviewAssociation).
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tion problems;the self-interestsof privatepartieswill mitigatetoward proprietarytechnology. Such problemsare of course solvable-but I think it is clear that the crucialquestion is whether
governmentwill take action.
Finally,the application-centered
approachto thinkingaboutthe
Internetis nothingso denigratingas the school of thoughtbest describedby its slogan:"thelaw of the horse."57The basicidea is that
there is no real utilityto the studyof Cyberspacelaw as one field,
in particularbecause (1) law professorsdo not understandcomputers("theblindare not good trailblazers")58
and (2) the best way
to studyspecializedtopicsis to studygeneralrules.5 To the extent
that the "lawof the horse"monikeris a criticismof overlygeneral
Cyberspacewriting,it echoes the ideas stated here. The problem
with this schoolof thoughtis thatit ignoresthe analysisand regulation that does make sense at the level of the whole Internet. The
big pictureis sometimesworththinkingabout-the Internet,after
all, can be thoughtof as nothingmore than a global agreementto
use the sameinformationtransmissionprotocols. For a networkto
be part of the Internet,it needs to "agree"to use the basic and
open Internet protocols, and lawyers like nothing better than
studyinglarge agreementsand their consequences. Just as the
AdministrativeProcedureAct anchorsadministrativelaw and the
tax code anchorstax law, studyof the Internetalso worksfrom a
sufficientlygeneralcommondenominator:the set of standardsthat
definethe Internet.6'

This is the monikerusuallyused to belittle overheatedInternetscholarship. Its
source is FrankH. Easterbrook,Cyberspaceand the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi.
Legal F. 207. For one thing,electricitywas a great advanceover the horse. See also
LawrenceLessig, The Law of the Horse:What CyberlawMightTeach, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. (forthcomingFall 1999).
5 Easterbrook,supranote 57, at 207.
59See id.
60 Just considerall the time spent studyingthe agreement"to form a more perfect
union."
61 In addition, even though I urge that we have to be careful to think about the
Internetin a technicallyrigorousand application-specific
manner,there is a lot going
on even within the confines of given applications. The World Wide Web and its
myriadof associatedapplicationsare a big topic;as I said earlier,Reno v. ACLU is a
great WorldWide Web decision,and it seems there will be more to follow.
57
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D
No discussion of the Internet/First Amendment tryst would be
complete without some mention of the issues surroundingfiltering
and the Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS"). Filtering technologies generally allow users to block out unwanted content according to either a fixed database or self-set preferences (a
preference system, of course, requires a standardrating system and
actual rating of all the content on the Internet).62 Filtering issues
are at present mainly relevant to the two most popular Internet
applications-email and the World Wide Web-although the concept and technology has relevance to future and other existing applications. There are two big questions in filtering. First, even
without government involvement, whether labeling of all content
under one standard will become the norm. Second, if the government does try to push filtering, whether its actions will be constitutional. What does an application-centered analysis tell us?
62 PICSis of particular
interest,and the followingis a shortintroduction.For more
thoroughexplanationsof PICS technology,see Paul Resnick & James Miller, PICS:
Internet Access ControlsWithout Censorship,39 Communicationsof the ACM 87
(1996) <http://www.w3.org/PICS/iacwcv2.htm>;
R. Polk Wagner,Filtersand the First
Amendment, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 755, 759-69 (1999) [hereinafterWagner, Filters];
Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 453 (1997).
PICS, as a format to facilitatinglabeling and, ultimately,filtration,has two distinguishingfeatures. First,PICS itself is describedas "value-neutral"because the content of the labels and the criteriaby which filtrationoccursare not specified by the
PICS formatitself. This, proponentsclaim,means that PICScan facilitateindividual
choice instead of circumscribingit-the user may choose the rating agency of his
choice, as one mightchoose a movie critic. The secondinterestingfeatureof PICSis
that it may be used at any level, or is "verticallyneutral." Thus, a PICS-basedfiltration system may exist at the browserlevel, residentin softwaresuch as InternetExploreror NetscapeNavigator. It is equallyat home, however,at the serverlevel, and
can be used to filter content availablein an intranetor to the users of an Internet
ServiceProvider("ISP").
No legislaturehas yet acted to legislate any form of labeling or blocking system,
althoughsome state actors, of course, such as libraries,use blockingsoftware. See
MainstreamLoudounv. Board of Trustees,2 F. Supp.2d 783, 787 (E.D. Va. 1998).
At present there are differentPICS-compliantlabelingstandardsthat enjoy varying
levels of use. See, for example, Net Shepherd, which has its own standard, at
<http://www.netshepherd.com>
(visitedJuly 13, 1999). There are also many less sophisticatedblockingprogramsavailablethat are designedmostly to protect children
from viewingindecent conductand allow some customization.See, for example,the
programs available at <http://www.netnanny.com>
(visited July 13, 1999);<httpi/
www.safesurf.com>(visitedJuly 13, 1999);and <http://www.cybersitter.com>
(visited
July 13, 1999).
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First,notice that the incentivestory differsby the type of Internet usage (i.e., application)at issue. The full pictureof the incentives for every party to the filtering scene-content providers,
users,InternetServiceProviders("ISPs"),ratingsites-is complex.
For our purposesit shallsufficeto make a few observations.First,
notice that content providershave little independentinterest in
self-labeling (but of course will respond to new incentives: If
enough users,or ISPs,block out unratedcontent,by default,content providerswill need to self-labelto be heard). The onus, ultimately,to create self-labelingpressure,or publicratings,is on the
users. But then whichusersare stronglyinterestedin filteringdepends on the usage in question. For an individualuser-by this I
meansomeoneusingthe Internetfor herself-the utilityof filtersis
in selecting desired content and avoiding unwanted content.
Hence, filtersare very usefulfor email and other invasiveapplications (like ICQ) because the user lacks many other methods for
avoidingunwantedcontent. But the situationis quite differenton
the WorldWide Web. For the Web, unlike email, there are powerful substitutesfor achievingthe goal of content selection. For
example,on the Web, searchengines are a better developed substitute to filtering technologies for getting what you want and
avoidingwhat you do not. At a more basic level, that browsers
put the decision of whether to download content in the user's
hands means, basically,that the user can filter for herself. So in
contrastto email or other invasiveapplications,the user in her individualcapacityhas little interestin WorldWideWeb filtering.
Web filtering,rather,is beloved of those who want to control
what contentis availableto others. These are people like parents,
libraries,companies,and governments-in other words,paternalists (thoughthis is not meant in a pejorativesense). And for the
Web, whetherlabelingof content will become the norm depends
on the efforts of these paternalisticusers. Yet two thingsmake it
unlikelythatthese userswill eitherprovidepublicratingsof the entire Web or try seriouslyto force individualsto self-label. First,a
collective action problemlurksbehind any provision(or compulsion) of a single,publicset of ratings.Thatis, even for the listeners
who want a single standardfor filtering,it is rationalto free-ride
off of either the publicratingsof othersor the effortsof othersto
force content providersto self-label. Second, the availabilityof
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private filtering services, based on private databases,may be a
cheap and good enoughsubstituteto erode the incentivesof these
usersto devote effortstowardestablishinga publicratingsystemor
enforcing self-rating. And it is perhapsthese factors-the lack
of an incentive among individual users, the collective action
problem, and the appeasementeffects of privatedatabasefiltering services-that have stunted, and will continue to stunt, the
emergenceof a single, public,and free ratingof the WorldWide
Web.
That is, unless it is governmentthat makesthingshappen. The
governmenthas the powerto pushthe architectureto an easilyfilterable WorldWide Web, or even to the entire Internet. But, of
course, when the governmentgets involved, so does the First
Amendment. And then everythingdependson two issues:(1) the
type of actionthe governmenttakes,and (2) the scope of Internet
usage affected (in other words,which applicationsare subjectto
this type of regulation). The writingon this topic has focused on
the firstissue63
andvirtuallyignoredthe second.
The second question,however,matters. Again, a split can be
seen between invasive and noninvasiveapplications. If government limitsits filteringlegislationto facilitatingthe filteringof privacy-invasiveapplications(say, email), it will be far less likely to
run into First Amendmentproblems. Of course,certaintypes of
government action to regulate email will raise larger First
Amendmentquestionsunderdoctrineslike the compelledspeech
doctrine."4
But the pointis thatno matterwhatthe governmentaction is, it will have an easiercase witha privacyinvasionon its side.
Whateverthe exact constitutionaltheory turns out to be, cases
from Rowan v. United StatesPost Office Department65
onward have

allowedthe governmentto protectcitizensagainstharassmentand
tormentin their homes. It is hardto imaginewhy an email inbox
63 See, for example,the thoroughsurveyof governmental
actionsin Wagner,Filters,
supranote 62, at 769-812,and ACLU, Fahrenheit451.2:Is CyberspaceBurning?:How
Ratingand BlockingProposalsMayTorchFree Speechon the Internet(1997).
14See McIntyrev. Ohio ElectionsComm'n,514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holdingas unconstitutionala requirementthat campaignliteratureidentify the speaker);Wooley v.
Maynard,430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holdingas unconstitutionala requirementthat citizens
displaysloganon license plate).
65 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (permitting
the post office to facilitateuser-directedfiltration
of real mail).
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oughtbe muchdifferent. And so I thinkthe variousantispambills
floatingaroundstate and federallegislatures,banningor facilitating filtrationof junk email,shouldsurviveFirstAmendmentscrutiny if draftedproperly.
Broad-basedregulationthat reachesthe WorldWide Web poses
a harder question. Nearly everythingdepends entirely on what
governmentactuallydoes to "helpout"filterinS each type of action leads to a differentconstitutionalanalysis. And so it is fairly
ridiculousto make the broadargumentthat PICS is or is not unconstitutional.A betterpredictionfollowsthe goldenrule that underlies First Amendmentscrutiny(and constitutionalscrutinyin
general):The more indirectand indeliberatethe governmentaction, the better.67
A word, finally,on LawrenceLessig and PICS. Lessig has not
been the greatestfan of PICS. He has at one point urgeda reincarnation(though not a resurrection)of the CDA as a kind of
short-termsacrificeto solve the indecencyproblemwithoutsideeffects.68This concessionmightbe no smallsacrifice. Couldsuch
an avowedlymild-manneredstandardreallybe so dangerousto all
thatis good aboutthe Internet?
Lessigarguesthat filtration-facilitation
by governmentwouldinexorablylead to a wholesalechangein the Internetarchitecture,to
an architecturethat facilitatesspeech discrimination.69
This is an
importantwarning. Unintended,even awful,consequencescould
follow a theoreticalmodel of coercivestate-sponsoredfiltrationincludinga tip-overinto a closed WorldWide Web environment
more reminiscentof the corporateIntranetmodel. This could be
especiallytrueif a PICSratingrequirement,meantfor end-userfil-

" See the sources cited supra note 63 for analyses of possible governmentaction
and attendantconstitutionalconsequences.
67 This conclusionis echoed by Wagner,Filters,supranote 62, at 812. On the point
that constitutionalscrutinyneeds to be drivenby governmentalpurpose,see, for example, Wardv. Rock Against Racism,491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The government's
purposeis the controllingconsideration.");Edmondv. Goldsmith,No. 98-4124,1999
WL 458618,at *6 (7th Cir.July 7, 1999) (governmentalpurposebehind roadblocksis
essentialto determiningconstitutionality).
,8See Lessig,WhatThings,supranote 46, at 650-51.
9 See id. at 665-70 (arguingthatlack of narrowtailoringwill doom generalfiltering
legislation).
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tering,metastasizedinto widespreadcentralizedfiltrationby dangerouspartieslike largeISPsor searchengines.
Yet there are reasonsto doubt that PICSwill be such a worry.
Ironically,third-partyprivateratingservicesfor the Web may be a
primaryobstacle, because any move to create a universalrating
schemethatbecomesunderstoodas a defaultrequirementneeds to
be both demonstrativelybetterand cheaperto set up and maintain
than payingfor a privateservice. Even with indirectgovernment
support,it is not immediatelyobviousthat the incentivesexist to
prompta quickmove to a fullyself-rated(or publiclyrated)World
Wide Web, let alone Internet. Drasticgovernmentaction would
do the trick-for example,a law that mandatedself-ratingof all
content under a single standardwould change the Internetovernight. But such direct governmentaction has a much higher
chance of being unconstitutional.It is also unclearthat any such
drasticlegislationis on its way.
So PICSmay not amountto a repealof the law of gravity. But
there is no denying that it is part of the general trend towards
Internetnormalization(especiallyof the WorldWide Web) in response to the perceivedneeds of normal,ratherthanexpert,users.
A persistentmistakehas been to assumethat the Internetwill not
change, while assumingsociety will, and radically. On the contrary,we have changedthe Internetmore than the Internethas
changedus; the Earth'sgravitationalpull on Cyberspacehas been
mightierthanthe reverse.
INTERLUDE:
How THENETWORK
ARCHITECrURE
OFTHE
INTERNET
AFEcrs LEGALANALYSIS

Scrutinyof all thingsInternetflows smoothlywhen it heeds the
architectureof the Internetin a rigorousway. Understandingthis
structure,admittedly,is not alwayseasy. But thinkof the topic as
akin to understandingthe structuralallocationof power among
governmentinstitutions-knowingwho is allowedto do what usually takes priorityover substantivediscussion. Similarly,since the
networkarchitectureof the Internetcan be perceivedas effectinga
delegationof the power to code, understandingthis architecture
can be essentialbeforereachingthe merits. Luckily,the Internet's
architectureis simplerthan the government's,and, as we will see,
the designof the Internetevidencesa clear choice. It grantsgreat
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power over functionality-a proxy for usage-to the designersof
applications. And since aspectsof humanusage are the facts that
ultimatelydrive Internetanalysis,the applicationis the beginning
of most legal analysis.
To understandthis point, two comparativelysimple but important structuralfeaturesof the Internetloom large. These are (1)
the "layered"architectureof the Internet,and (2) the "end-to-end"
design principle. Quite obviouslythese two design featureswere
not chosen for their legal consequences. Rather,concernsof efficiency, modularity,scalability,and futureflexibilitydrove the design of the Internet. But these choicesnonethelesshave a critical
impacton anylegal analysis.
A LayeredArchitecture

What it means for a network to have a layered architecture,
viewedall at once, can be at firstdifficultto grasp,yet the idea is so
clever that it merits understanding.7A networkcommunication
between computersis a very complexoperation. The essence of
networklayeringis a grandsimplificationby delegationto functional submodules,the layers.71Dividing one large task among
severallayershas numerousadvantages-it allowsspecializedefficiency, organizationalcoherency, and future flexibility-and is
somethingwe constantlysee in the real world yet considerunremarkable. Consider,as a way to understandthis, what happens
when one lawyeruses the postalsystemto mail a legal argumentto
anotherlawyer. The postal systemis structuredso that no one in
70
Whatfollows is a highlysimplifiedexplanation. A more thoroughexplanationof
networkarchitecturein general and layered architecturesin particularcan be found
in any basic data network text. See, e.g., Uyless Black, Data Networks:Concepts,
Theory, and Practice 269-88 (1989); John McConnell, InternetworkingComputer
Systems: InterconnectingNetworks and Systems 14-31 (1988); Andrew S. Tanenbaum,ComputerNetworks (3d ed. 1996). While these sources focus on the InternationalOrganizationfor Standardization'sOpen SystemsInterconnection(OSI)
Model, a model seven-layernetworkarchitectureusefulfor comparisonand categorization purposes,the underlyingconceptsare the same as those for the two-layerarchitecturedescribedhere.
71 Those familiarwith computerprogramming
will recognizethe logical parallelbetween a layered architectureand the basic programmingtechniqueknown as structured programming(dividinga given program'stasksamongfunctionalmoduleswith
clearly defined inputs). For a formalcomparisonof structuredtechniquesand networklayering,see Black,supranote 70, at 273-75.
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the postal system needs to understandlaw (the languageof the
lawyers)for the messageto be successfullydelivered. And, similarly, neither lawyerneed do anythingmore than understandthe
ruleson addressingandpostage. Thismakesfor a simpletwo-layer
network. The functionof understandingthe contentsof the letter
has been delegatedto a "higher"layer (in this case lawyers),and
the function of delivering the letter has been delegated to a
"lower"layer(the postalsystem).

LawyerA
I-

E- Interpretation-l
(handledby lawyers)
Transport

LawyerB

-I

(handledby postalsystem)

In this example,the postallevel is called "lower"becauseit can be
seen as more fundamental.The lawyersneed the postalsystemor
they cannotcommunicateat all;yet if the lawyersdid not exist, the
postal system would continueto carrymail for doctors,scientists
and other interpretersof strangelingo. Notice also that the postal
system is more fundamentalin the sense that it can set standards
that applyto everyonein the higherlevels, regardlessof who they
are. For example,the postal service could requirethat all envelopes be blue. The higher-levelusersof the systemwouldhave no
choicebut to comply.
Notice severalthingsabouta networkso structured.First,it allows an efficient specialization:That the postal system need not
understandlaw (or the content of any of the messagesit carries)
dramaticallyreducesthe burdenon the post office and allowsit to
focus on one task: deliveringmail. Second, the system is very
flexible:The postal systemcan carryany type of message,and the
communicationwill be successful,providedthat the personon the
otherside understandsit. Thismakesthe postalsystemusefulfor a
wide varietyof applications.Finally,the layersare modular:Were
the postal systemto begin usingspaceshipsto deliverits mail, the
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lawyerswould be unaffectedso long as the rules for postage and
writingaddressesremainedthe same.
The Internetsharesthis same basic structure. Internetapplications-email and so forth-operate separatelyfrom and above
the set of basic Internetprotocols,knownas TCP/IP. The Internet's network architecturegives applicationstheir own layer tQ
interpretthe data they send to each other withoutworryinghow
it got there. And the basic Internetprotocols(with some exceptions not importanthere) are invariableand are used by all applications, much in the way that lawyers,plumbers,and doctors all
use the same postal system.
The basicnetworkstructureof the Internetlooks as follows:
Application Protocols

*-

e*

(varyby application)
Transport |
Layers

-

TransportProtocol
(usuallyTCP)

Application

Layer

e*

Network Protocol i

e-

(IP)
*-

LinkProtocol

i*

So while there are actuallyfour layersin the Internetarchitecture,
for many purposesthe most importantdistinctionis between the
transportlayers, the set of (mostly72)constantInternetprotocols
that handle the basic data transmissions,and the interpretation
layers,the huge varietyof possible applicationsthat make use of
the datasent aroundby the transportlayers. A reminderagainthat
72 It should be here admitted that there is actually more than one protocol that
serves the "packaging"function of TCP. The descriptionI give is a simplification;
the variousdatagrampackagingprotocolsserve essentiallythe same function.
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this descriptionrepresentsonly the most basicaspectsof the design;
readerswho are interestedin preciselyhow the TCP/IPprotocols
functiontogetheraredirectedto the sourcesin the footnote.
End&to-End
Design
The decision to adopt a layerednetworkarchitecturedoes not
answerthe subsequentquestion:where, exactly to place network
function within this architecture. The architecture,alone, is an
emptyshell-it suggeststhatthe dutyto code functionwillbe delegated among layers, but not how. Many functions could have
been made a part of the basic Internetprotocols, or have been
left to the applicationlayer. For example,most of what makesup
the email system could be made a part of the basic transmission
protocols of the Internet or left for the applicationdesigner to
decide.
Hence, the importanceof the end-to-enddesignprinciple. This
principle,formallydescribedas an argumentin a famous paper
twenty years ago, 4 holds that, whereverpossible,functionshould
not be placedat the lower-levelsof a networksystem-rather, everythingpossibleshouldbe left to the applicationsat the "ends." In
other words, the lower-levelprotocolsshould focus only on the
minimalfunctionof transmittingdata,and in all other respectsbe
kept as simple,unintrusive,and open as possible. This designphilosophy,along with a few others,underliesthe architectureof the
Internet.

73 More in depth, yet still readable,introductionsto TCP/IPinclude Peter Rybaczyk, Novell's InternetPlumbingHandbook (1998), and MatthewFlint Arnett et al.,
Inside TCP/IP(2d ed. 1995). An online introductionis CharlesL. Hedrick,General
Description of the TCP/IP Protocols (1987) <http://oac3.hsc.uth.tmc.edu/staff/snewA more thoroughTCP/IPreferenceis Douglas E. Comer,
ton/tcp-tutorial/sec2.html>.
Internetworking with TCP/IP: Principles, Protocols, and Architecture (3d ed.
1995); a more general computernetwork reference is Tanenbaum,supra note 70.
Detailed technical descriptions of the TCP/IP protocols are contained in the
following Requests For Comments ("RFC"), the standards "legislation"of the
Internet: RFC 793 (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html>
(TCP); RFC 791 (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc791.html>
(IP);
RFC 894 (visitedJuly 13, 1999) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc894.html>
(Ethernetand
IP); RFC 882 (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc882.html>
(name
servers).
74 See Saltzeret al., supranote 2.
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The originalend-to-endpaper,writtenby JeromeSaltzer,David
Reed, and David Clark,pressedthe end-to-endargumentas a narrow issue of efficiency. It arguedthat placingfunctionat lower
levels wouldbe redundantwheneverthe functionin questioncould
not be achievedwithoutthe participationof the applicationsat the
One can see intuitivelythatthe less the
"ends"of the connection.75
"engine"of any networkneeds concernitself with, the faster and
cheaperthe networkwill be.
But an end-to-enddesign has deeper effects.76The principle
amountsto a salutarydelegationof the codingpowerin the Internet structureto the designersof applications. It grantsthe maximum possible applicationautonomy, giving to the application
writersthe freedomto achieveapplicationgoals in whatevermanner they see fit, and innovate wheneverand however they like.
And at the same time, by confiningthe networkitself to simple
functionsof broadusage,the designavoidsblockingout futureapplicationsunknownor unpredictableat the time of design. For example,the WorldWide Web was only a theoreticalconstructeven
at the time the modem Internetprotocolswere adoptedon January 1, 1983.77And at least in partas a resultof these features,this
decadehas witnessedan astonishingdevelopmentboth of Internet
applicationsexistingat the beginningsof the Internet(like email)
and totallynew and extremelyinnovativeapplications.All of this
mighthave been impossible,or at least difficult,if the Internethad
not hadan end-to-enddesign.
The Internet'slayered architectureand embeddedend-to-end
designhavecreatedan Internetwherecodingpowerresidesamong
the designersof application. It allows-even encourages-an astoundinglylargeset of possibleapplicationsand ensuresthat there
is very little that is necessarily true about the Internet as a whole.

Hence,talkof the Internetas a wholewilloftenbe nonsensical,if not
now,thensoon. Thisarchitectural
realitystronglysuggeststhatmeaningfullegal analysisneedsto focuson the level wherevariation,and
the powerto code function,are found. In otherwords,legalanalysis
of the Internetneedbeginto takeapplication
diversityseriously.
ee id.
See Reed et al., supranote 3, at 72.
77 See id.; Rybaczyk,supranote 73, at 26.
7S

76
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II. PRIVATE ORDERING: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF
CYBERSPACESOVEREIGNTY

Is Cyberspacea place? Should it have its own rules? These
questions once served as the focus of deeply acrimoniousdebate.78 One side called Cyberspacesovereign, while the other
equatedthe Internetwith the telephone. Both, I want to suggest,
were wrong and right;wrong for the entire Internet,yet potentially rightabout certainapplications.The errorwas the same on
both sides:mistakingone way of using the Internetfor the entire
Internetitself.
Today, the sovereignty debate has become academic. The
popularityof the Internetand the onset of seriouscommercialactivity has led directly to real legal disputes;real, that is, in the
sense of tangible injuryand benefit. And, without terrible fuss,
courtsin this countryand elsewherehave provedneitherincapable
of nor shy in decidingInternetcases.79These predictabledevelop78
See, e.g., LlewellynJ. Gibbons,No Regulation,GovernmentRegulation,or SelfRegulation:SocialEnforcementor SocialContractingfor Governancein Cyberspace,
6 CornellJ.L. & Pub. Pol'y 475 (1997);JackL. Goldsmith,Against Cyberanarchy,65
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998) [hereinafterGoldsmith,Against Cyberanarchy];
Jack L.
Goldsmith,The Internetand the Abiding Significanceof TerritorialSovereignty,5
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 475 (1998); Steven M. Hanley, InternationalInternet
Regulation:A MultinationalApproach, 16 J. MarshallJ. Computer& Info. L. 997
(1998);David R. Johnson& David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996) (statingthe case for Cyberspacesovereignty);
LawrenceLessig, The Zones of Cyberspace,48 Stan. L. Rev. 1403, 1407-10 (1996)
[hereinafterLessig, Zones] (criticizingJohnson& Post, supra);Henry H. Perritt,Jr.,
The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in
StrengtheningNational and Global Governance,5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 423
(1998); David G. Post, The "UnsettledParadox":The Internet,The State, and the
Consentof the Governed,5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.521 (1998) (delvinginto internationalrelationstheory);Shapiro,supranote 46; TimothyS. Wu, Note, Cyberspace
Sovereignty?-The Internetand the InternationalSystem,10 Harv.J.L. & Tech. 647
(1997) (attackingthe descriptiveassumptionthat the Internetis impossibleto regulate). For a collectionof some of these and other articles,see Bordersin Cyberspace:
Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure(Brian Kahin &
CharlesNesson eds., 1997). For a quickoverviewof this debate, see the "BrainTennis" exchange between David Post and Jack Goldsmithin the Hotwired Archive
(visitedJuly
<http://www.hotwired.com/synapse/braintennis/97/34/nc-left-intro.html>
13, 1999).
79A Westlawsearchshows 191 reportedfederalcases after 1995that raise Internetrelated issues (the cases were isolated by searchingthe texts of Westlaw'ssynopses
and digests). These cases cover a huge spectrum,from trademarklaw to personaljurisdictionquestionsto obscuretort doctrinessuch as "trespassto chattels." See, e.g.,
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ments,and the lack of any seriousdemandfor a Cyberspace-based
legal authority,have stillborndreamsof a Cyberspacenation.
Fromthe beginning,it was clearthat the descriptiveargumentthe claimthat Cyberspacecannotbe regulated-would fall moot.81
This old cyberlibertarian
bromideself-destructsunderthe glare of
technicalscrutiny8'
and the simplerecognitionthat regulationneed
not be perfect to be effective-that regulation works through
transactioncost ratherthan hermeticseal.`2 Considerfor a moment the observationthat a lock may be picked;interesting,no
doubt,but not a convincingdemonstrationthat a lock cannotserve
any regulatingfunction. Cyberlibertarians,
some of whomhave the
Internet skills equivalentto the real-spacelocksmith,generalize
fromtheirown experienceto concludethatno regulationof Cyberspace is possible. But neitherthe theorynor the resultsare conBrookfieldCommunications,Inc. v. West Coast EntertainmentCorp., 174 F.3d 1036
(9th Cir. 1999) (trademarklaw);BensusanRestaurantCorp.v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d
Cir. 1997) (personaljurisdictionalquestions);CompuServe,Inc.v. CyberPromotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (trespassto chattels). Significantly,in none
of these cases did a court decide that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. This
painless exercise of adjudicatoryjurisdictionhas been paralleledby a similarlack of
reluctanceto exerciseadministrativeand prescriptivejurisdiction.
Courtsoutside the United States seem to have similarlyexercisedjurisdictionwith
little hesitation. See, e.g., 1267623OntarioInc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., No. C 20546/99,
1999 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1289 (Ontario Super. Ct. June 14, 1999) (lawsuitin Canada
againsta bulk emailer);Queneauv. Leroy, [1998]ECC 47 (T.G.I. 1997) (European
Courtcase of Internetcopyright);BritishTelecomm.v. One In A MillionLtd., [1999]
1 W.L.R. 903 (C.A. 1998) (lawsuit in England against a fraudulentdomain name
dealer); Alan Cowell, Head of German Web Sentenced for Pornography,N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1998,at A3.
80For a thorough explanationof my view on this point, see Wu, supra note 78.
That note examinesthe technologybehindInternetregulationand concludesthat, as
a descriptiveissue, regulationof the Internetis clearlypossible (most effectively,using laws that compel the adoptionof a certainarchitecture,as Singaporeand China
have done), and that the interestingissue is whetheror not states will want to impose
regulationon the Internet.
81 The strongestevidence that this descriptiveargumentis essentiallya grandhoax
comes from any examinationof firewall technology,the highly developed security
technologythat alreadywallsoff muchof the Internet. See id. at 653. For a good introduction,see John P. Wack & Lisa J. Carnahan,Keeping Your Site Comfortably
Secure:An Introductionto InternetFirewalls(NationalInst. of Standardsand Tech.
SpecialPublicationNo. 800-10,1995)<http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/nistpubs/800-10/>.
2 See
Wu, supra note 78, at 650. This point has been oft-made. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,supra note 78, at 1224-25;Lessig, Zones, supra note
78, at 1405.
8 Jeffrey Schillermakes the interestingargumentthat, because ordinaryusers can
quicklygain access to the securitycrackingtools of an expert,everyone on the Inter-
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vincing-if regulationis impossible,then what are criminalhackers8 doingin prison?5
So what of this debateis left behind? I wantto suggestthat the
interestingquestionsaboutself-governanceon the Internetremain
collected aroundparticularparts of the Internet,often particular
applications,and not around"Cyberspace"
as some kindof fantasy
kingdom. Noticethatthe normativecase for stateregulationof the
Internetdependson the applicationyou have in mind. If you decide to log onto an airline website to buy a plane ticket, there
doesn'tseem to be any terriblyconvincingreasonto treat this any
differentlythan the phone call that could have been made in its
stead. But for a groupof MUD" userswhose environmentis ennet can quickly become an expert security evader. See Jeffrey Schiller, Internet
Rights versus InternetSecurity,Talk Sponsoredby the M.I.T.Technologyand Culture Forum(Mar. 18, 1997). I think this conclusionrests on a fundamentallyerroneous assumptionabout how much time and energy an ordinaryuser is willing to
committo masteringarcaneexperthackingtools for deeply modestreturns.
84There exists a valiant, but perhapshopeless, effort to try to preserve the term
"hacker"as a reference to those whose skill with computersexceeds the common
user's, and to distinguish"criminalhackers"as those who abuse their superhuman
powers.
85See United States v. Thomas,74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (operatorsof obscene
bulletinboard systemsentencedto federal prison);United States v. Morris,928 F.2d
504 (2d Cir. 1991) (Bob Morris,originatorof the Internetworm, sentenced to fine
and probation);Andrew Blankstein, Hacker Sentenced to Prison, Told to Avoid
High Technology,L.A. Times, June 29, 1997, at B3 (famous hacker Kevin Mitnick
sentenced to prison); Paula Span, Modem Operandi:Phiber Optik, the Bad Boy
Hacker, Out of Stir and On-Line,Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1995, at B1; infra notes 102,
104-05 and accompanyingtext (death threat by email, defamation,and securities
fraud).
1
A MUD is a programrunningon a remote serverthat creates a virtualenvironment that can be accessedby remote users,who assumethe identityof charactersin
that world. MUDs vary. Some are actuallygames,some are purelysocial, and many
have specialthemes (e.g. everyoneplaysan animalor perhapsa StarTrek character.)
A MUD user typicallyhas a high degree of control over her own identity as it appears to other users,and can walk aroundthe "world"interactingwith other usersor
other objects situatedin the MUD, usuallyorganizedby "room." At a higherlevel,
users can create and programtheir own objects,includingthe possibilityof creating
(somewhat) artificiallyintelligent objects (robots). Finally, there are many MUDtype programswith similarnames, such as MOO (MUD, Object Oriented),MUSH
(Multi-UserShared Hallucination),TinyMUD and TinyMOO,and LPMUD (roleplayingMUD).
What makes MUDs particularlyinterestingis that they offer humaninteractionin
an entirely user-createdworld, with user-createdidentities. Since the powers that
charactershave can lead to abuse of others, there are typicallyrules or laws in a
MUD, enforced,if necessaryby "Wizard"figureswho have greater(technical)pow-
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tirely virtualand who perhapssee their physicallives as distinctly
secondary,allowingthis groupof people to make their own rules
does not seem outrageous. It is the crossoverthat is outrageous:
the suggestionthatmy onlineticketpurchasebecomesgovernedby
some weirdlaw of CyberspacebecauseI used a packetinsteadof a
dial tone or the idea that the U.S. Congressought to enact the
membershiprulesof LambdaMOO(a popularMUD)."'
But make no mistakeabout the bottom line. The second, selfcontainedtype of Internetusageis only a fractionof total usageand, more importantly,a type of Internetusage deeply unlikelyto
triggerany legal consequence. Much Internetusage, rather,has
significantreal-spaceeffects, and with such effects comes the normativecase for jurisdiction. Even if there were a parallelauthority in Cyberspace(beyondthat createdby contract),the existence
of concurrentjurisdictionis nothing particularlysurprisingto a
twentiethcenturylegal system.89So only the few applicationswith
ers to do thingssuch as delete a certaincharacterfrom the MUD. MUDs also offer
the possibilityof an environmentand identity ultimatelycustomizableto individual
preference;for these reasons,a well known MUDism holds that users see their real
lives as just another,less interestingwindow.
Social scientistshave an unsatiablefascinationwith MUDs, and the literatureon
the sociologyof MUDs is vast-there is even a refereedacademicMUD journal. For
some of the most famouswritingson MUDs, see SherryTurkle,Life on the Screen:
Identity in the Age of the Internet (1995) (providingan excellent introduction);
JulianDibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace,Village Voice, Dec. 21, 1993,at 36. The Journal of MUD Researchcan be found at <http://journal.tinymush.org/-jomr/>
(visited
July 13, 1999), and a lengthy collection of MUD-related academic papers can be
found in the "Lost Libraryof MOO"at <http://lucien.berkeley.edu/moo.html>
(visited July 13, 1999).
"IThe telnet site from which to enter the famous LambdaMOO(runningout of
Xerox Park) is <telnet://lambda.moo.mud.org>
port 8888, and visiting there is definitely a worthwhileexperience. It must be warned,however, that the expert users
alreadythere have a tendencyto be somewhatimpatientand abusivewith newcomers. As theirgatewaypage itself states:
LambdaMOOis a new kind of society, where thousandsof people voluntarily
come together from all over the world. What these people say or do may not
alwaysbe to your liking;as when visitingany internationalcity, it is wise to be
carefulwho you associatewith and whatyou say.
Id.
" Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
?? 402(1)(c), 403, 421(j) (1987) (statingthat "substantialeffect"is a basisfor prescriptive and adjudicatoryjurisdiction).
89This is not to say that concurrentjurisdictiondoes not raise tough issues, but it is
nonetheless a nearly unavoidablefact of life in a world with more than one legal jurisdiction,and events that implicatemore than one state. See MarkW. Janis,An In-
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basicallyno real-spaceeffect-mostly, consensualfantasyworlds
like MUDs-have any serious normativeclaim to immunityfor
thingsthat happen"there." And so we can see that the manipulation of the MUD model into an analogyfor all of Cyberspaceis
what created this fallaciousdebate in the first place. It makes a
perfect example of mistakingthe features of an applicationfor
those of the entire Internet,and the whole discussionseems destinedto becomea curiousrelicof earlyInternethistory.
This is actuallyan exceedinglygeneroustreatmentof the issue,
for it makes the kindlyassumptionthat the developmentof some
kind of generalCyberspaceregulatoryauthorityis somewhatplausible.90It is hardto even considergrantingcomityto "Cyberspace"
lackinganyoneto grantcomityto. And as it happens,this assumption is more for fun than anythingelse; Star Warswithouthyperspace would be a boringmovie. But in this galaxythe prospects
are remote at best. There will, of course,alwaysbe some private
ordering-internalrules for web hosting,MUD codes of conduct,
domainnames, and so on. But a Cyberspace-wideauthoritythat
regulatesevery transactionthat happensto run throughthe Internet looks aboutas likelyas a city on the bottomof the ocean. Like
the ocean city, the main problemis that somebodyhas to want it.
No one does. Tellingis the humorousfate of the "VirtualMagistrate"project:The VirtualMagistratehas apparentlyretiredfrom
Cyberspaceadjudication,and ironicallyhas become a font for advice on real-spacelaw.'
troductionto InternationalLaw 249 (1988) ("Thereactuallyare countlesssuch cases
of concurrentjurisdiction...."). Complexrules have evolved to attemptto handle
problems of concurrentjurisdiction. See, e.g., Restatement(Third) of the Foreign
RelationsLaw of the United States?? 401-33 (1987).
90On the feasibility of a Cyberspace-basedlegal authority, see MargaretJane
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace,74 Chi.-KentL. Rev. (forthcoming1999). These authors
stress the lack of a realistic mechanism for enforcement of any Cyberspace regime's rules.
91The VirtualMagistrateis, accordingto its website, "a specialized,on-line arbitration and fact-findingsystem for [online] disputes"run by the Villanova Center for
InformationLaw and Policy <http://vmag.vcilp.org/>
(visited July 13, 1999). Unfortunately, the Virtual Magistrateappears to have taken an extended recess (three
years and counting),with no indicationof when he might return. In his more active
days the VM did arbitrateone case orderingAOL to remove an advertisementfor
junk email fromits system,yet it is unclearwhetherAOL ever actuallycompliedwith
the order,or what the VM would have done if AOL didn't. The site has instead become, for unknownreasons, a forum for terse legal advice on a variety of issues-
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So there is no case for deferenceto Cyberspaceas some kind of
empire of our imagination. But I think there are nonethelessinstanceswhereparticulartypesof Internetusageconstitutethe kind
of private regime, familiarin our world, that can waive all but
mandatoryregulationby states-in effect, a privatecontractualorder. And in suchcases statesand courtsoughtto respectgenerally
the waiversand the rules set up by these privateregimes,as they
do for any privateorderset up by any privategroup. But where,
on the Internet,is this appropriate?
The easiest thing to do is to look at the Internetusage in question and ask what,exactly,the partieshave agreedto throughthat
usage. But generally,the variation,unsurprisingly,is found between applications.The observedvariancein how "contained"an
applicationis suggestsa usefulguide. It suggestsa basicdistinction
betweenwhat can be calledthe Internetas a meansand the Internet as an end."
By the Internetas a means,I have in mind the more mundane
use of the Internetto serve as an alternative(perhapsan enhanced
alternative)to a preexistingmeansof achievinga preexistingobjective. The crucialissue is the presenceof tangible,real-spaceeffect.
So you mightbuy a plane ticket throughthe WorldWide Web, issue a death threatby email,or make an Internetphone call. You
happento use Internetpacketsto do so insteadof usingpreexisting
means;hence, the Internetas a means. By Internetas an end, I
mean usage directedtowardsends createdby the online environment itself. As a result,real-spaceconsequenceis minimal. The
really "pure"examplesof this are the popularonline games like
Ultima Online93
or networkQuake,94whichare multi-userversions
from leaseholdsto sexual harassment-from partiesof unclearassociations. See Virtual Magistrate Discussion Area, Conference Room 109 (visited July 13, 1999)
<http://www.cilp.org/cgi-secure/confcenter/109/>..
For anothervirtualcourtproposal,see
Henry H. Perritt,Jr., Jurisdictionin Cyberspace,41 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 100-01 (1996)
(proposinga "United States DistrictCourt for the Districtof Cyberspace"but conceding that the SeventhAmendmentissueswouldbe troublesome).
WAn alternative nomenclature might be the distinction between Cyberspace
(Internet as an end) and Internet (Internet as a means), but this also might cause
more confusionthanit cures.
"IUltima Online allows thousandsof players (currently90,000) simultaneouslyto
play the same multi-userfantasybased game,all takingplace in the same,large world
(Britannica). The programmersattemptedto write into the Ultima code a complicated social structurethat would provide rewardsfor altruismto maintainsocial order and to create an online economy (althoughthese attempts,in the first editions,
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of computervideo games. Real-worldgoals aren'tterriblyimportant to playersof Ultima Online (in that capacity);the goals are
createdby the game itself, and, for example,no one sues another
characterif she dies. MUDs are a strongsecondaryexampleand
are often more interestingbecauseof theirhighlydevelopedset of
socialnormsand "Wizard"-enforced
rulesbasedon repeatedinteractions. Lesser examplesare varioustypes of chatroomsand discussion groupslike Usenet. But notice that for all of these types
of activities,the moniker"Cyberspace"
suddenlyhas a resonance
that just seems lackingwhen I use email to schedule my dentist
appointment.
Obviouslythis is an imperfectdichotomy. First,of course,even
the "Internetas an End"applicationshave some real-spaceeffects.
So long as we retaina physicalmanifestation,therewill be no total
escape from real-worldconsequences.And this helps explainwhy
the normativecase forfull immunityis so weak.
Second, and more interestingly,there is a huge categoryof Internet usage that achieves preexistinggoals in new ways-ways
that changethe way we thinkof thingsand perhapseven the way
we need to regulatethings.95And becauselaws and otherformsof
regulationare usuallypremisedon a set of assumptionsabout the
context in which they will operate, a change in a technological
have largely been a failure). See ThierryNguyen, Origin'sEpic Online Game Is
Snaredby Bugs and Design Problems,ComputerGamingWorld,Feb. 1, 1998,at 162.
But the productis makingmoney, and at a recent press conferenceOrigin,the company that created Ultima Online, revealed that usage averagesout to 3.5 hours per
user per day. See OmarL. Gallaga,Ultima Online'sSuccessBetter Than Expected:
Origin's GarriottSays He's Comfortableon the Business Side of Gaming, Austin
Am.-Statesman,Oct. 8, 1998,at C1.
Interestingly,Ultima Online has not been immuneto real world law. A group of
disgruntledgainershas sued the publisherof UltimaOnlinefor providinga game that
allegedlyfailed to live up to its hype. See MichaelHawash, The UO Lawsuit:Gamers Sue ElectronicArts, OriginSystems,SayingUltima Online Was Misrepresented,
Computer Gaming World, Nov. 1, 1998, at 46. The Ultima Online website is at
<http://www.owo.com>
(visitedJuly 13, 1999).
94Quake is a popular and less sophisticated"shoot 'em up" game that can be
played over the Internet;it also has online "clans"associatedwith it and a certain
etiquette that prohibits,among other things, using robots to aim for you. See Network Quake Newbie Guide (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.gamers.com/features/1997-12/14-quake-newbie/home.asp>.
9sLawrenceLessig has explored these issues in great depth. For a representative
example, see LawrenceLessig, Reading the Constitutionin Cyberspace,45 Emory
L.J.869 (1996).
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"fact,"even if apparentlyunrelatedto the law, may nonetheless
have largeunexpectedeffectson the operationof that law. "Internetization"typicallyresultsin a massivereallocationof transaction
costs; this tends to lay bare those laws that (unknowingly)relied
heavily on those costs as a kind of regulatory"crutch." This effect has been demonstratedwith great clarityby the example of
online porn,whichwe mightthinkof as regularpornminustransaction costs. But althoughthese effects cloud the picture, they
still, in my view, do not create any constantnormativepresumption against "regular"laws, other than for reasons of prudence
and ripeness."
So thisjust suggeststhat the normativecase for a distinctregime
of rules dependson what usage or applicationon the Internetyou
are talkingabout. But descriptively,we know that very few existing usagesof the Internethave a good normativecase for immunity
to real-spacelaw. It is true that membersof LambdaMOOought
be the ones to set the rules of theirworld;it makeslittle sense for
the governmentto try to legislatethe law of Lambdabecausemost
MUD activityaffectsonly the people involved. Like any groupof
individuals,they oughtbe allowedto maketheirownrulesfor their
activities,just as the National Hockey League, not the Attorney
General,sets the penaltiesfor "high-sticking."And, of course,this
isn'tparticularlydifferentfromsayingthatit probablyworksbetter
if we let any special group set its own rules, be it the member
LambdaMOOersor the Shasta County Cattlemen." After all,
Robert Ellicksontells us that these group norms will be welfare
maximizing.99
Thisbeing said, agreeingthat people oughtto make
theirown rulesfor theirown gamedoes not compelanyconclusion
that participantsshould gain some shield from mandatorylaw

91As was pointed out earlier,laws usuallyoperate to increasethe costs of a given
activityratherthan to somehowpreventthat activityentirely.
`1On this point, see Denver Area EducationalTelecommunicationsConsortium,
Inc.v. FCC,518 U.S. 727, 774-78 (1996) (Souter,J., concurring)(arguingfor gradualist regulationof new technology);Lessig, The Path, supranote 46, at 1745 (stating
that "if we had to decide today ... just what the First Amendmentshould mean in
cyberspace... we wouldget it fundamentallywrong").
`1
The normsgoverningthe relationsof the ShastaCountyCattlemenare studiedin
great depthin RobertEllickson,OrderWithout Law (1991).
99See id. at 167-87.
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(such as the criminallaws), other than from consent.1wTo the extent that, for MUDs, outsideeffects are a rarity-a functionof the
application-the presenceof mandatorylaw is barelyfelt.'01
But here as there, as soon as signs of real-worldconsequences
begin to show up, the case for any distancefromterritorialregulation weakens correspondingly.And finally,when a death threat
arrivesby email insteadof by letterl' nobodybothersto arguethat
the Virtual Magistrateought to jump in and preempt territorial
criminallaw (or thatshe is even capableof doingso).
All of this stronglysuggeststhat talk of a thickCyberspacesovereigntyis reallyconvincingonly whentalkingaboutMUDs, video
games,or other exercisesof fantasy,becauseit is only when using
these kindsof programsthat the Cyberlibertarian
point aboutselfcontained online activitymakes any sense. Move along to chat
roomsand real-time"talk"applicationslike ICQ,103
andthe normative argumentfor privateorderbeginsto thin;certainlyan antitrust
conspiracymade over ICQ has no specialshield. Enter discussion
groupsor anythingelse that looks like one-to-manycommunication, and suddenly things like defamation laws0'4or securities

100Jack Goldsmith,drawingon conflictslaw, points out the default law/mandatory
law distinction,noting that default laws can be modified to fit the needs of the parties, but mandatorylaws cannot. See Goldsmith,Against Cyberanarchy,supranote
78, at 1209-12.
101For extensive studyof the relationshipsbetween formallaw and informalnorms,
see the work of Lisa Bernstein. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein,MerchantLaw in a Merchant Court:Rethinkingthe Code'sSearchfor ImmanentBusinessNorms,144U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1765 (1996);Lisa Bernstein,OptingOut of the Legal System:ExtralegalContractualRelationsin the DiamondIndustry,21 J. Legal Stud.115 (1992).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997) (reversing
threat convictionbut without regard to use of email as means of communication);
Thao Hua, Ex-StudentSentencedfor Hate E-MailCourts:RichardMachadois Fined
$1,000,Put on Probationfor ThreateningAsian AmericanStudents,L.A. Times,May
5, 1998, at A24. See generallyBrooke A. Masters,When E-Mail is a Weapon, Victims Strugglefor Protection,Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1998, at B1 (listing cases of email
harassmentand threatconvictions).
103ICQ ("I Seek You") is a programthat facilitatesonline chat by allowingusersto
searchfor friendsand associatesonline and then chat via a sharedwindow. For more
see the materialsat <http://www.icq.com>
(visitedJuly 13, 1999).
104 See, e.g., Blumenthalv. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.44 (D.D.C. 1998) (lawsuitagainst
Internet columnistMatt Drudge for allegedly defamatoryremarksmade about Sidney Blumenthal).
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laws'05
begin to make theirpresencefelt. Whenan applicationhas
spillover-real-space effects-the jurisdictionalquestions are all
too familiarto the studentof internationallaw.""
The debateover Cyberspacesovereigntyhas been swallowedby
recent history. Cyberspace,as one unit, is not about to becomea
sovereignjurisdiction,not in this galaxyat least. But whatapplication-centeredanalysistells us is that thereare interestingquestions
about private ordering on the Internet, and that they revolve
aroundparticularusagesand applications.The applicationlevel is
where the open architectureof the Internetleaves real room for
privateregimes. But the overarchinglessonfromthishistoricalcuriosity is that manipulationof analogy;one concept of what the
Internet"is"can lead quicklyto total nonsense.
CONCLUSION

Let me end this Essay with a less seriousobservation,one that
has been expressedbeforein differentways.107The latestroundsof
Internetsloganeeringhave been the talk of a funnykind of vested
interest-not the usualsuspects,but a kind of Madisoniannotable
of the computerage best knownas the "expertuser."'08The fight
over these slogansand over FirstAmendmentscrutinyexposes an
interestingrunningbattle between these entrenchedexpert users
(and those who considerthemselvessuch) and newcomernormal
users.Expertusersliketheslogans.Why? Becauseexpertuserssuffer least and benefit most from an unregulatedInternet. Remember, after all, who actuallyuses encryptionsoftwareand who still
needs help opening attachments;who knows what mp3s are and
how to get them and who just paysmore for CDs at the store;and,
105The Securitiesand ExchangeCommission("SEC")appearsto have become very
active in its enforcementof securitieslaws online. In October 1998 the SEC announced the resultsof the first nationwideInternetsecuritiesfraudsweep, involving
charges being filed against44 people in 23 actions,mostly for stock touting online.
See SEC Does a 'Net Sweep and Charges44, Nat'l L.J. Nov. 9, 1998,at A9. For details on these lawsuits, see SEC Litigation Releases <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/
litig.htm>(visitedJuly 13, 1999).
106
See Goldsmith,AgainstCyberanarchy,supranote 78, at 1212-39.
107See, e.g., JonathanZittrain,The Rise and Fall of Sysopdom,10 Harv.J.L.& Tech.
495 (1997).
10 For more on Madisoniannotables,see RobertoMangabeira
Unger, WhatShould
Legal AnalysisBecome? (1996).
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of course,who knowshow to disableMicrosoftExplorer'sdomination of the desktopandwho endsup stuckwithit. The truthis that
normal users might one day (or perhapsnow) want the help of
their governmentin some or all of these areas. Or they mightnot.
The problemis that the constitutionallaw of Cyberspace,as it is,
wants to make this choice in advanceand encase it in concrete.
The sentimentis well-intentionedand also well-argued. But to
stick everyonewith the constitutionof the expertuser may, in the
long run,prove the inexpertmove, as it may do more to close out
the Internetthanflexibilityeverwould.

